This well-researched book details the ambiguity in British policy towards Europe in the Cold War as it sought to pursue dĂŠtente with the Soviet Union whilst upholding its commitments to its NATO allies. From the early 1950s, Britain pursued a dual policy of strengthening the West whilst seeking dĂŠtente with the Soviet Union. During the German Question, British statesmen realized that only through compromise could the elusive dĂŠtente with Moscow be achieved, and the West German hard line towards the East (endorsed by the United States) was thus seen as perpetuating tension. This cast British policy onto an insoluble dilemma, as it was caught between its alliance obligations and its search for compromise, but it successfully adapted to the new realities and made hitherto unknown contributions towards dĂŠtente in the early 1960s, applying for British membership of the EEC in 1961. Drawing on unpublished US and UK archives, Britain, Germany and the Cold War casts new light on the Cold War, the history of dĂŠtente and the evolution of European integration. This book will appeal to students of Cold War history, British foreign policy, German politics, and international history.